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Abstract:  
In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which expected inflation might 
influence the money demand, using a microeconomic model where the transactions of 
the representative agent are facilitated by its holdings of money. We assume that the 
agent holds a real asset, along with a range of nominal assets, that may include 
domestic money, foreign money, domestic bonds and foreign bonds. In this model, 
the optimal choice between money and bonds is embedded in a portfolio choice 
between the real asset and risky assets (the Merton problem). We show that, as long 
as the agent is not constrained in her holdings of bonds, the demand for domestic 
money will not, in general, depend on expected inflation. The demand for money may 
however become a positive function of the inflation rate in case the agent is 
constrained in her holdings of foreign bonds. The only case in which the demand for 
domestic money may depend negatively on the inflation rate is when the agent faces a 
binding constraint in her holdings of domestic bonds.  
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1. Introduction 
A usual procedure in empirical models of money demand is to specify the 
inflation rate in the set of explanatory variables. This procedure is not controversial, 
when the inflation rate appears instead of the nominal interest rate in the money 
demand equation. This will be the natural thing to do, for instance, when estimating 
the money demand in economic environments characterized by financial 
underdevelopment or by financial repression: if individuals are not given the 
opportunity to buy interest-bearing bonds, or in case interest rates in domestic 
securities are administratively set at below-market levels, then the relevant 
opportunity cost of money may turn out to be a real asset. The same applies to 
episodes of hyperinflation, when the inflation rate becomes so high that dwarfs the 
real interest rate inside the Fisher relationship. In both cases, expected inflation 
replaces the nominal interest rate as an argument in the demand for domestic money.   
More controversial is when both the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate 
are included as arguments in the money demand function. This procedure 
characterizes the so-called portfolio-balance approach to money demand, which roots 
lie in the works of Milton Friedman and James Tobin (see, for instance, Friedman, 
1956, Tobin, 1958, 1969). The portfolio approach focuses on the store of value role of 
money. In light of this approach, money is modelled as an asset, without any 
particular feature that makes it distinguishable from other assets. In many applications 
of the portfolio model, money is postulated to be gross substitute of all other assets, 
giving rise to money demand functions that depend positively on income and wealth, 
and negatively on the return of each alternative asset. This includes the nominal 
interest rate (capturing substitutability between money and bonds) and the inflation 
rate (capturing substitutability between money and real assets). A recent article in this 
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tradition, that has inspired various empirical studies focusing on the euro area money 
demand, is Ericsson, 1998)1.  
A problem with the Portfolio Balance Approach is that it is not capable of 
explaining why money is held in the portfolio despite being dominated by assets that, 
in the words of Barro and Fisher (1976, p. 139), “have precisely the same risk 
characteristics as money and yield higher returns“. This criticism underlies a number 
of theoretical models that attempted to account for the means of payment role of 
money and integrate it into the theory of asset demands.  
Attempts to account for the means of payment role of money include models 
where real money balances are specified as an argument in the consumer utility 
function (Sidrausky, 1967), and models assuming that holding money allows 
consumers to save in transaction (or “shopping”) costs  (Saving , 1971)2 3. Both 
models give rise to optimal money demands that obey to a trade off between the 
benefits of holding a means of payment and the cost of a foregone interest, typically 
                                                
1 In the literature trying to identify a stable money demand relationship in the euro area, authors 
that accounted for a possible role for inflation as opportunity cost of holding money include Fase and 
Winder (1998), Coenen and Vega (2001), and more recently, Dreger and Wolters (2010).  
2 A related approach is to postulate “cash in advance constraints”, whereby individual’ 
purchases each period cannot exceed the quantity of money being held (Clower, 1961). As pointed out 
by McCallum and Goodfriend (1988), the deterministic version of the cash-in-advance model can be 
interpreted as a special case of the “shopping-costs” model, with the relationship between money and 
transactions being linear, in contrast to the more general formulation where any volume of transactions 
can be undertaken with a given amount of money, though at increasing transaction costs.   
3 A completely different avenue is to address the essence of money, modelling the matching 
game between buyers and sellers (Kiyotaki and Right, 1989). In this paper, we abstract from the 
fundamentals of transaction services, to focus on the simpler case in which the transactions demand for 
money is implied by an ad hoc “shopping costs” function.  
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on a domestic bond (see, for instance, Barnett, 1978, McCallum and Goodfriend, 
1988)4.  
Attempts to integrate the shopping costs model into the theory of asset demands 
include Branson and Henderson (1985) and Thomas (1985). These authors 
demonstrated that, as long as individuals have unrestricted access to interest-bearing 
nominal assets (or liabilities), they will be able to hedge the risk implied by their 
holdings of like-denominated monetary assets. In that case, money demands will be 
independent of portfolio decisions. In Branson and Henderson (1985), domestic 
money is the sole means of payment, so there is a unique opportunity cost of holding 
money, which is the nominal interest rate in the domestic bond. In Thomas (1985) 
both domestic and foreign money provide liquidity services, so the choice between 
these two means of payment involves a comparison between the respective marginal 
productivities in the production  of liquidity services and holding costs (the domestic 
and the foreign interest rates, respectively). In  any case, money demands are 
independent of portfolio decisions.  
The assumption of complete bond markets is obviously a strong one. In many 
countries, common citizens have access to dollar banknotes, or even to bank deposits 
denominated in a foreign currency, but they hardly consider long term bonds 
denominated in foreign currency in the range of possible applications. Along this 
reasoning, Cuddington (1989) argued that, in case perfect capital mobility does not 
hold, the demand for money should reflect both a transactions and a portfolio 
component. Lebre de Freitas and Veiga (2006) explored this avenue, extending the 
Thomas (1985) model to the case in which the agent faces a binding constraint in her 
holdings of foreign bonds. The authors found that in this case the demand for 
domestic money may be indeed influenced by portfolio decisions, but only in case 
foreign money competes with the domestic money as means of payment.  
                                                
4 As demonstrated by Feenstra (1986), under very general conditions, specifying real money 
balances as an argument in the utility function or as an argument of a transaction costs function 
appearing in the budget constraint leads to money demand functions that are functionally equivalent.  
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A limitation in Lebre de Freitas and Veiga (2006) is that the authors only 
accounted for the possibility of the representative agent investing in nominal assets. 
In the real world, however, people are given the opportunity to allocate part of their 
wealth to assets that offer some protection against the inflation risk. This includes, for 
instance, real state and bonds with interest rates being adjusted on a regular basis 
according to some specified index. In episodes of very high inflation, people are often 
given the opportunity to invest in assets that are fully indexed to the inflation rate5. To 
the extent that agents have the opportunity to hold assets that hedge the inflation risk, 
a question arises as to whether, in case the demand for money becomes influenced by 
portfolio considerations, it becomes influenced by the inflation rate too.  
In  this paper, we extend Thomas (1985) and Lebre de Freitas and Veiga 
(2006), by investigating the properties of the optimal demand for money in the 
presence of a an asset offering a certain real return. We use an optimizing model 
where money reduces the frictional losses from transacting in the goods market. In 
this model, the inflation rate is random, so holdings nominal assets involves a risk. 
The model accounts for both domestic and foreign money, as well as for domestic 
and foreign bonds. The optimal demand for money is therefore embedded in a 
portfolio choice between the safe asset and risky assets. In this framework, we are 
able to distinguish three types of decisions concerning the asset composition of the 
agent’s real wealth: speculation, which refers to the allocation of part of an agent’ 
wealth away from the safe asset towards nominal (monetary and non-monetary) 
assets, in exchange for higher returns (the Merton problem)6; Asset Substitution, 
which refers to the switching from nominal assets denominated in domestic currency 
to nominal assets denominated in foreign currency7; and Currency Substitution, 
                                                
5 A well known example is Brazil during the high inflation episodes. At that time, different 
forms of indexation spread across the economy, including in wages, rents and financial securities. 
Government bonds indexed to the inflation rate were instituted along 1964-1991 (see, for instance, 
Goldfajn, 1998).     
6 Merton (1969).  
7 The international investor portfolio choice, in Branson and Henderson (1985). Sahay and 
Végh (1996) label this as “dollarization”.  
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which refers to the substitution of domestic money by foreign money as means of 
payment. The paper compares alternative scenarios regarding the availability of 
bonds, but in all scenarios the individual is allowed to hold an asset paying a certain 
real return.  
In the more general case where all assets are available, the separation between 
money demands and portfolio decisions applies. In that case, the demand for domestic 
money does not depend on the inflation rate. When, in alternative, the agent faces a 
binding constraint in its holdings of foreign bonds, foreign money gets a store of 
value role, in addition to its eventual means of payment role (Lebre de Freitas and 
Veiga, 2006). In this case, means of payment substitutability opens a channel through 
which the demand for domestic money may be influenced by the relative yields of the 
different assets, including the inflation rate. The surprising result in this case, is that 
the eventual impact of expected inflation in the demand for domestic money will 
positive, rather than negative, as usually assumed. The intuition is as follows: suppose 
the individual holds a bank account denominated in foreign currency, along with a 
bank account denominated in domestic currency, a domestic bond paying a certain 
nominal return (say, a long term government bond) and an asset paying a certain real 
return (say, real state). If, everything else constant, the expected inflation decreases, 
the individual will reallocate wealth away from the real asset to nominal bonds and 
foreign currency deposits. In case foreign currency deposits are liquid enough to 
substitute for domestic money in the provision of liquidity services, the fact that the 
individual holds more of these deposits allows her to save on domestic currency 
deposits, which holdings involve an opportunity cost. All in all, the fall in inflation 
rate caused a decline in the demand for domestic money - hence, the positive 
relationship. Of course, the arguments presumes that the inflation rate declines while 
the expected exchange rate depreciation remains constant. In case prices and the 
exchange rate move exactly together - as it tends be the case in episodes of very high 
inflation – then the inflation rate does not influence the demands for foreign and 
domestic money. This is demonstrated in the analysis below.  
As a second exercise, we restrict further the range of available assets, by 
imposing a binding constraint on the holdings of domestic bonds. Since in this case 
domestic money is not dominated by an interest-bearing asset, its’ demand will be 
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influenced by risk-return considerations, as well as by transaction motives. In this 
setup, the inflation rate arises as the relevant opportunity cost of holding domestic 
money. Strictly speaking, this does not assure, however, a negative relationship 
between money demand and inflation: as long as the return on foreign money is not 
perfectly correlated with inflation, the mechanism described above through which the 
demand for domestic money may increase with the inflation rate is still in operation. 
In this  case, however, this mechanism is mitigated by the fact that inflation is the 
opportunity cost of holding money. Therefore, on balance, the sign of the inflation-
money demand relationship is uncertain. In order to obtain an unambiguous negative 
relationship between money demand and inflation in the context in which the agent is 
constrained in the holdings of domestic and foreign bonds, one has to impose further 
restrictions in the model’ parameters.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The general model with 5 assets is presented in 
Section 2. In Section 3, we solve for the optimal money demand in the case with 
complete bond markets. The case in which the agent faces a binding restriction in her 
holdings of foreign bonds is examined in Section 4. In Section 5, we further restrict 
the agent’ options, by imposing a binding constraint on her holdings of domestic 
bonds. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The basic model  
Consider an infinitely lived consumer, living in a small open economy. There is 
one consumption good only, which domestic price is equal to P. The consumer is 
endowed with a constant flow of the good, denoted by y. She maximises the expected 
value of a discounted sum of instantaneous utility functions of the form:  
dtce
o
tt∫
∞
−
−
−
Ε
φ
φ
β
1
1
, (1) 
where ct denotes real consumption at time t, β is a positive and constant subjective 
discount rate, and 0>φ  is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.   
The individual has unrestricted access to domestic money (M), foreign money 
(F) and a real, safe asset (S). Bonds denominated in domestic currency (A) and in 
foreign currency (B) may or may not be freely available, depending on the 
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institutional framework under consideration. Among these assets, only domestic 
money and foreign money are assumed to be liquid enough to provide transaction 
services.   
The individual's real wealth is defined as: 
sbafmw ++++= , (2) 
where PMm = , PEFf = , PAa = , PEBb = , PSs = , P is the domestic price 
level, and E is the exchange rate.  
Money holdings earn zero nominal returns. Domestic and foreign bonds have 
certain nominal returns, represented by i and j, respectively.  
idt
A
dA
=  
jdt
B
dB
=  
Holding nominal assets is risky because prices and the exchange rate evolve 
stochastically, altering their real value. We postulate the following stochastic 
processes for prices and for the exchange rate:  
dZdt
P
dP
σπ += ,  (3) 
and  
dXdt
E
dE
γε += , (4) 
where dZ and dX are standard Wiener processes. The instantaneous correlation 
between the two stochastic processes is given by ! = !".!" !" = ! !", where ρ 
is the covariance.  
In light with the theory of purchasing power parity, the exchange rate 
depreciation is expected to be positively correlated with the inflation rate. However, 
in the real world, this correlation is not in general perfect due to real shocks. Thus, in 
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our baseline scenario, we assume that 0<R<1. Notwithstanding, in the discussion that 
follows we will also consider the extreme cases in which R=0 and R=18.  
Using Ito's lemma, the real returns to domestic bonds, domestic money, foreign 
bonds and foreign money are as follows:  
( ) dZdtrdZdti
a
da
a σσπσ −=−−+=
2 , (5) 
( ) dZdtrdZdt
m
dm
m σσπσ −=−−=
2  , (6) 
( ) dXdZdtrdXdZdtj
b
db
b γσγσρπσε +−=+−−−++=
2 , (7) 
( ) dXdZdtrdXdZdt
f
df
f γσγσρπσε +−=+−−−+=
2 . (8) 
The real return on the safe asset is: 
  rdt
s
ds
=         (9) 
Purchases of the consumption good are assumed to imply a transaction cost (τ), 
that depends positively on consumption expenditures (c) and negatively on real 
money holdings, according to the following functional form:  
!"
#
$%
&=
c
f
c
mcv ,τ ,                                    (10) 
with 0(.) >v , 0<kv ,  012 ≥> vvkk , and 0
2
122211 >−=Δ vvv , k=1,2. In (10), τ  refers 
to the amount of real resources spent in transacting, and a subscript k (k=1,2) to the 
function v(.) denotes partial differentiation with respect to the k argument.  
The fact that foreign money provides liquidity services does not imply that it 
can substitute the domestic currency as means of payment. Means of payment 
substitutability occurs when some fraction of the consumption bundle can be 
                                                
8 In case the exchange rate and the inflation rate are perfectly correlated, the foreign bond B and 
the real asset become perfect substitutes. Under such specification, foreign money, F, can be 
interpreted as an indexed means of payment (for instance, overnight deposits paying an interest rate 
that is fully indexed to the inflation rate).  
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purchased with money denominated in either currency, so that 12v  is strictly positive. 
In this paper, we postulate a weak form of means of payment substitutability, 
whereby the marginal productivity of each money is more impacted by changes in the 
holdings of that money than by changes in the holdings of the competing money9.   
The consumer’s flow budget constraint is determined by real returns and saving 
decisions:  
( )[ ]( )dtvcydrdbdadfdmdw .1+−+++++=  
Using (5)-(9), this becomes:  
( ) ( )dZswdXfbdtdw −−++Φ= σγ , (11) 
with ( )[ ].1 vcysrbrarfrmr bafm +−+++++=Φ  
The consumer maximises (1), subject to (11). To account for restrictions on 
nominal bond holdings, we formulate the problem assuming that a and b are confined 
to the following control sets:  
0≥− bb  (12) 
0≥− aa   (13) 
These constraints will be assumed to be binding or not, depending on the 
institutional framework under consideration.  
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the corresponding quasi-stationary 
problem is:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
!
"
#
$
%
&
+−−−+++Φ+
−
=
−
≤≤
fbswswfbwVwVcwV
bbaafmc
σρσγ
φ
β
φ
2)(''
2
1)('
1
max)( 2222
1
,,,,  
where V(w) is the optimal value function. The first order conditions in respect to b, f , 
a and m imply:  
[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )[ ] λρσργ =−−++−+− swfbwVrrwV b 22)´´()('  (14) 
                                                
9 Apart from that assumption, the transactions technology follows Carlos Végh (1989). The 
model only deals with imperfect currency substitutability The equilibrium implications of perfect 
means of payment substitutability are discussed in Kareken and Wallace (1981), for the case in which 
agents face no binding restrictions on money holdings, and in Lebre de Freitas (2004), for the 
“asymmetric” case, in which foreign residents cannot hold domestic money 
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[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )[ ] 0)´´()(' 222 =−−++−+−− swfbwVrvrwV f ρσργ  (15) 
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] µρσ =+−−+− fbswwVrrwV a 2)´´()('  (16) 
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 0)´´()(' 21 =+−−+−− fbswwVrvrwV m ρσ  (17) 
where 0≥λ  and 0≥µ  are the Lagrangian multipliers associated to the constraint 
(12) and (13), respectively. Conditions (14) and (16) accounts for both interior and 
boundary solutions: according to the Khun-Tucker complementary slackness 
conditions, if for instance constraint (12) is not binding, then λ=0.  If, instead, 
constraint (12) is binding, then λ>0 , meaning that lessening the constraint would 
have a positive impact on the optimal value function. The same holds for the 
Lagrangian multiplier µ. 
3. The case with no restriction on nominal bond holdings 
In this section, we briefly revisit the case in which nominal bonds in both 
currencies are freely available. In terms of the formulation above, this case is 
accounted for by postulating a large enough values for a and b , so as to ensure that 
restrictions (12) and (13) are not binding. 
 Substituting µ=0 and λ=0 in (16) and (14) and subtracting, respectively, from 
(15) and (17), one obtains10:  
0,1 =!
"
#
$
%
&
+
c
f
c
mvi , (18) 
0,2 =!
"
#
$
%
&
+
c
f
c
mvj . (19) 
Equations (18) and (19) implicitly define the money demand functions, as 
obeying to a trade-off between transaction services and user costs. 
Using λ=0 and µ=0 in (14) and (16) and the envelope condition 
)(')('' wVwwV−=φ , one obtains:  
                                                
10 Thomas (1985).  
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( ) ( ) !
"
#
$
%
& +−+!
"
#
$
%
& −−=
−
w
fb
w
srrb ργρσ
φ
22 1  (14a) 
!
"
#
$
%
& +−!
"
#
$
%
& −=
−
w
fb
w
srra ρσ
φ
12  (16a) 
Subtracting (16a) from (14a) and after some manipulation, the following two 
conditions are obtained:  
!!
"
#
$$
%
&
!
"
#
$
%
&
−+!!
"
#
$$
%
& −
=
+
22 1 γ
ρ
φγ w
srr
w
fb ab  (20) 
( ) ( )
Σ
−+−
=−
φ
ργ aba rrrr
w
s 21  (21) 
Where 0222 >−=Σ ργσ  . This parameter is positive, because R<1.   
Equation (21) is the reincarnation of the Merton formula for this particular 
context, and captures the speculative demand for nominal (risky) assets: it states that 
the agent is induced to allocate part of her wealth away from the safe asset towards 
nominal assets, depending on her degree of risk aversion, the expected return 
differential and uncertainty (in this case, with the later two adjusted for the presence 
of a foreign bond11).  
Equation (20) recovers the international investor portfolio rule (Branson and 
Henderson, 1985) in this specific context of asset availability (the case with s=0 is 
addressed in Lebre de Freitas and Veiga, 2006). It states that the optimal level of 
Asset Substitution, depends on a speculative component (first term) and on an 
hedging component (second term). The term 2γρ gives the proportion of assets 
denominated in foreign currency (bonds plus money) that minimises the purchasing 
power risk of the nominal component of the portfolio. According to (20), the 
consumer is induced to move away from that proportion by the expected return 
differential (first term on the right hand side), and the extent to which she moves 
depends on her degree of  risk aversion, φ.  
                                                
11 In case ρ=0, the demands for domestic denominated assets and for foreign denominated 
assets simplify to the conventional Merton formula.  
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In this version of the model, because domestic and foreign money are 
dominated by interest-bearing assets, their demands are driven by transaction 
purposes, only (equation 18 and 19): after deciding the optimal money balances in 
each currency, taking into account the respective liquidity services and opportunity 
costs, the consumer can borrow or lend in both currencies so as to achieve the optimal 
denomination structure of its portfolio (20), and then the optimal partition between 
risky assets and the safe asset (21). These two choices are independent of money 
holdings  (Thomas, 1985). 
As an example, consider the extreme case in which the degree of risk aversion 
is infinity, so that the agent wants all its wealth to be held in the form of the safe asset 
(s=w). In that case, she will hire liabilities in domestic and foreign currency so as to 
exactly match its holdings in like-denominated moneys (that is, a+m=0 and b+f=0). 
Thus, money demands are determined by interest rates and transaction services, only, 
and the optimal structure of the portfolio in terms of real assets and nominal assets 
does not depend on money holdings.  
Using (18), (19), and (10), the demand for domestic money takes the following 
form:  
),( jiL
c
m m=  with 022 <
Δ
−=
v
Lmi  and 0
12 ≥
Δ
−=
v
Lmj .    (22) 
),( jiL
c
f f=  with 012 ≥
Δ
=
v
Lfi  and 0
11 <
Δ
=
v
Lfj .       (23)   
In the particular case in which there is no currency substitutability ( 012 =v ), 
each money demand will depend only on the respective opportunity cost.  
4. The case with a binding constraint on foreign bond holdings  
We now turn to the case in which the agent faces a binding restriction on 
foreign bond holdings. This case captures the context of many developing and 
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emerging market economies, where private agents have no easy access to bonds 
denominated in foreign currency12.  
Since the individual cannot use foreign bonds to hedge the risk exposure 
implied by foreign money balances, unless inflation and exchange rate depreciation 
are perfectly correlated, the demand for foreign money will obey to risk-return 
considerations. In that case, foreign money will compete with the real asset in the 
store of value function.  
When condition (12) is binding, the lagrangian multiplier λ  in (14) is positive. 
Subtracting (14) from (15) with λ>0, one obtains:  
0,2 >!
"
#
$
%
&
+
c
f
c
mvj  (19b) 
Comparing to (19), equation (19b) reveals that, in this case, the consumer holds 
a higher amount of foreign money than if there was no restriction on foreign bond 
holdings. This captures the existence of a portfolio demand for foreign money.  
This case solves similarly to the one before, except that equation (14a) is now 
replaced by  
( ) ( ) !!
"
#
$$
%
& +
−+!
"
#
$
%
& −−=
−−
w
fb
w
srvrf ργρσ
φ
222 1  (14b) 
Subtracting (14b) from (16a), and using (12) in equality, one obtains the 
optimal level of “asset substitution” in this particular context:  
!!
"
#
$$
%
&
!
"
#
$
%
& −+!!
"
#
$$
%
& −−
!!
"
#
$$
%
&
=
+
22
2 11
γ
ρ
γφ w
srvr
w
bf af  (20b) 
                                                
12 Sahay and Végh (1996) adapted the model in Section 3 to the context of developing 
countries, by interpreting foreign money f as denoting for foreign banknotes held by the public and the 
foreign bond b as denoting for bank deposits denominated in foreign currency, which are available to 
common citizens in many developing countries. In light of that interpretation, the proposition that there 
is no portfolio demand for money applies. Note however that this interpretation presumes that foreign 
currency deposits provide no transaction services at all, which is not likely to be a general case. The 
model in this sections proposes and alternative framework, in which foreign money (broad sense) plays 
simultaneously a store of value and a means of payment role.  
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The novelty in (20b) relative to (20) is that the marginal productivity of foreign 
money ( 02 <v ) replaces j in the expected return differential. This reflects the fact 
that the demand for foreign money is driven by both transaction motives and risk 
hedging considerations.  
Because the properties of the money demand in this setup  depend critically on 
the assumption  regarding the covariance between the exchange rate and the inflation 
rate, in the following we solve the model for three cases regarding the size of that 
covariance.  
4.1. Positive but imperfect correlation between prices and the exchange rate (0<R<1)       
To investigate the determinants of money demand in this case, we first solve 
together (14b) and (20b) as functions of the exogenous parameters, only, obtaining:   
[ ] [ ]
Σ
−+−−
=−
φ
γρ 221
rrrvr
w
s aaf  (21b) 
[ ] [ ]
Σ
−+−−
=
+
φ
ρσ rrvrr
w
bf aaf 2
2
 (24) 
Taking differences in (18) and (24) and solving for dm and df as functions of 
the exogenous parameters, the following partial derivatives are obtained:  
( ) 01212222 <!"
#
$%
& +−+
Σ
Ω
−
= ρσ
φ vvv
w
cc
di
dm                            (25) 
012
2 ≤
Ω
−
= vc
d
dm
σ
ε
                                                           (26)  
012 ≥Ω
== vc
dr
dm
d
dm
ρ
π
                                                       (27) 
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σ
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γ
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dw
dm φ                               (30) 
( )[ ]1211211 vvvcdi
df
−−
Ω
= σρ                                          (31) 
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With 011
2 >
Σ
+Δ=Ω v
w
cφ
σ . 
In this version of the model, there is no portfolio role for domestic money: since 
domestic money is dominated by an interest-bearing bond, its demand is driven by 
transaction purposes, only (eq. 18). The demand for domestic money may however be 
influenced by portfolio considerations through the currency substitution channel: as 
long as 012 >v , then any change in the demand for foreign money by speculative or 
risk hedging reasons will impact on the demand for domestic money, even if the later 
is dominated by an interest-bearing asset (equations 26-29). In case of no currency 
substitutability ( 012 =v ), the demand for domestic money assumes the conventional 
form:  
( )iL
c
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= v
w
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ϕ                    (37) 
From (27) and (33), we see that expected inflation influences the demand for 
foreign money negatively and the demand for domestic money positively, at most. 
The reason is that foreign money is imperfect substitute of the real asset in the store 
of value function. Hence, when the inflation rate increases, the agent will reallocate 
wealth away from foreign money to the real asset (eq. 33). If, in plus, foreign money 
competes with domestic money in the means of payment function, then the higher 
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inflation rate will give rise to a Currency Substitution effect through which the higher 
inflation rate translates into a higher demand for domestic money13.  
Note however that the positive relationship between money demand and 
inflation only holds for the definition of money comprehending monetary assets 
denominated in domestic currency. A broad definition of money, including monetary 
assets denominated in both currencies (the sum m+f), is expected to depend 
negatively on the inflation rate, because the sum of the partial derivatives (27) and 
(33) is positive. The implication is that the expected sign of a coefficient capturing 
the influence of the inflation rate in a money demand equation depends critically on 
the type of money aggregate we are handling with: when one estimates the demand 
for a monetary aggregate that includes assets denominated in domestic currency only, 
then the expected sign of the inflation coefficient, after controlling for the exchange 
rate depreciation, is – at most – positive. If however the monetary aggregate includes 
foreign currency deposits, which – in the absence of foreign bonds - are likely to be 
held for both transaction motives and portfolio reasons, then the relationship between 
inflation and money demand is expected to be negative.   
Similar comments hold for the relationship between money and wealth. The 
fact that foreign money gets a portfolio role implies that it will depend positively on 
real wealth (equation 36). In case of currency substitutability, an increase in wealth 
that leads to an increasing demand for foreign currency translates into a lower 
demand for domestic currency (equation 30). On balance, the demand for total money 
(m+f) increases with real wealth. 
As for the expected exchange rate depreciation, it acts in the model as the yield 
on foreign currency: whenever the expected exchange rate depreciation increases, 
everything else constant, people will hold more of foreign money (equation 32). In 
case the two monies compete as means of payment, this causes a fall in the demand 
                                                
13 If, in alternative, prices and the exchange rate were negatively correlated, the agent would 
optimally respond to an increase in expected inflation with a diversification move, increasing 
simultaneously her holdings of the real asset and of foreign money. In that case, the sign of the partial 
derivative (27) would be negative. The assumption  of a means of payment with a return that correlates 
negatively with the inflation rate is not however realistic.  
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for domestic money (equation 26). Because a higher expected depreciation implies a 
higher return on average money, it causes the demand for total money to increase (the 
sum of the derivatives 25 and 31 is positive).  
4.2. Purchasing power parity holding instantaneously ( 22 γσρ == ) 
In episodes with very high inflation, citizens often replace domestic currency by 
a foreign currency (usually the US dollar) in the unit of account role of money. When 
this is so, agents first set prices in units of foreign currency, and then they use the 
current exchange rate to calculate the corresponding prices in units of domestic 
currency, for invoicing and settlement purposes. When this is so, prices and the 
exchange rate correlate almost perfectly.  
To capture this case, we solve the model above assuming that R=1. It is also 
assumed that the standard deviations of the stochastic processes (3) and (4) are the 
same14:  
22 γσρ ==       (38) 
Since expected inflation and expected exchange rate depreciation correlate 
perfectly, in this setup foreign money provides a perfect hedge against the inflation 
risk, just like the real asset. The main difference between foreign money and the real 
asset is that the later is not liquid enough to provide transaction services.  
Using (38) in (14b), one obtains15:  
r
c
f
c
mv =−"
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%
&
'
− πε ,2                                (39) 
                                                
14 One may interpret  f  in this version of the model as standing for an overnight bank deposit 
denominated in domestic currency paying a nominal interest rate equal to the daily inflation rate. In 
terms of the model above, these two interpretations are equivalent.  
15 We stick with the interior solution postulating επ >+r .  
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This condition implicitly defines the demand for foreign money in this 
particular setup. The condition is similar to (19), except that in this case foreign 
money is dominated by the real asset, instead as by a nominal bond.  
Because in this version of the model both monies are dominated, the 
proposition that there is no portfolio demand for money is recovered: each money 
demand depends only on the respective productivity in the provision of transaction 
services and of opportunity costs (equations 18 and 39). Variables that are relevant 
for  portfolio decisions such as total wealth and inflation volatility fail to influence the 
money demands.  
The partial derivatives of the money demands in respect to the relevant 
parameters are obtained totally differentiating (18) and in (39) and solving together:  
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Because in this version of the model the exchange rate and the inflation rate as 
collinear, it makes no sense to calculate the two partial derivatives separately. As 
shown in (41) and (44), changes in expected inflation and on expected exchange rate 
depreciation cancel out, so they fail to influence the money demands.  
In this version of the model, the elasticity of money demand in respect to the 
real interest rate is expected to differ from that of expected inflation. Because the real 
interest rate is the relevant opportunity cost of holding foreign money, whenever it 
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rises, the demand for foreign money will decline. In case domestic and foreign money 
compete as means of payment, the lower demand for foreign money will translate into 
a higher demand for domestic money.  
4.3. Foreign money delivering a certain nominal return ( 0== ργ ) 
We now examine another extreme case, in which the correlation between 
expected inflation and the expected exchange rate depreciation is zero16.  
0== ργ                                       (46) 
Because in this version of the model there is no uncertainty regarding the 
exchange rate, one may interpret  f  as standing for a time deposit denominated in 
domestic currency paying a certain nominal return that is lower than that in the 
domestic bond (ε < i), but that at the same time is liquid enough to complement 
narrow money (m) in the means of payment role17.   
   In this version of the model, the real return on  f  is:  
 ( ) dZdtrdZdt
f
df
f σσπσε −=−−+=
2                        (8d) 
The real returns on narrow money (m), the domestic bond (a), and the real asset 
(s) are given, respectively, by (5), (6), and (9). Because both moneys are now 
dominated by the same nominal asset, conditions (18) and (19) are replaced by:  
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That is, at the optimum, the agent will hold the two moneys such that the 
difference in productivities in the provision of liquidity services is exactly matched by 
                                                
16 The case with 0>γ does not differ qualitatively from the one analysed below.  
17 In alternative, one may think a credibly fixed exchange rate regime, with the domestic 
inflation rate drifting up and down around some level consistent with the peg, and with ε  denoting for 
a nominal interest rate in foreign currency demand deposits (without loss of generality, this parameter 
can be set equal to zero). 
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the nominal return on the time deposit. As long as the time deposit pays a positive 
interest rate (ε>0), narrow money will be at the margin more productive as means of 
payment than quasi money. 
The signs of the partial derivatives can be obtained substituting (46) in (25)-
(36), which implies: 
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Once again, because both moneys are dominated (in this case, by the domestic 
bond), there is no portfolio demand for money. The expected inflation rate and 
inflation volatility influence the optimal demands for the real assets and for the 
domestic bond, but fail to influence the money demands. The later are only driven by 
transaction services and opportunity costs (i and i-ε). The inflation rate and inflation 
volatility will influence the optimal demand for the real asset and for the domestic 
bond, but will not impact on money demands. 
In sum, splitting money into a narrow component, more productive in 
transaction services, and quasi money, less liquid but paying a positive interest does 
not change the main conclusion that, as long as both are dominated by an interest 
bearing bond there should be no portfolio demand for domestic money.  
5. The case with binding constraints on domestic and foreign bond 
holdings 
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We now turn to the case in which constraints (12) and (13) are both binding. In 
this case, unless prices and the exchange rate are perfectly correlated, no money will 
be dominated as store of value.  
When condition (13) is binding, the Lagrangian multiplier µ  in (16) is positive. 
Subtracting (16) from (17), with µ>0,  one gets: 
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Similarly to (19b), equation (18c) implies that the consumer will hold a higher 
amount of domestic money than in the case in which domestic money is purely held 
for transaction purposes.  
Because the consumer faces no binding constraints on money holdings, 
conditions (15) and (17) hold in equality. Rearranging, and using 
)(')('' wVwwV−=φ , one obtains (14b) again and:  
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As before, we proceed investigating the properties of the money demand 
considering three different cases regarding the magnitude of the co-variance 
parameter.  
 5.1. Positive but imperfect correlation between prices and the exchange rate (0<R<1)            
Solving together (14b) and (17c) for the exogenous parameters, one obtains: 
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Subtracting (22c) from (21c), one obtains:  
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Equation (21c) reveals that the individual’ optimal deviation from the safe asset 
depends now on the “yields” of domestic and foreign money, as well as on the degree 
of risk aversion. On the other hand, (24c) and (52) imply that the optimal demands for 
foreign money and for domestic money also obey to a balance between risk and 
return. This captures the portfolio role of moneys.  
As long as domestic money is essential for transactions (that is, if 1v  tends to 
minus infinity as m approaches zero), it will be impossible for the consumer to 
completely get rid of the inflation risk. She may, however, optimally decide to accept 
higher costs in transacting in the good market against a lower risk exposure, in case 
the cost of holding money increases. Because this choice is complicated by the fact 
that the demands for both moneys are driven by risk-hedging considerations as well 
as by transaction services, in this version of the model, the signs of the different 
partial derivatives are not obvious.  
To see this, let’s totally differentiate the equations determining the money 
demands (24c) and (52), and solve for dm and df. After some manipulation, the partial 
derivative in respect to the inflation rate can be expressed as follows:   
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Simplifying, this gives: 
 ( ) ( )!
"
#
$
%
&
−+(
)
*
+
,
-−
Ψ
−
=
∂
∂
1222
2 vv
w
ccm φ
ργ
π
  (53a) 
 The corresponding partial derivative in the demand for foreign money is:  
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Equation (53) reveals that the optimal response of the demand for domestic 
money to an increase in expected inflation involves a balance between two opposing 
effects:  
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- On one hand, to the extent that the inflation rate is the relevant opportunity 
cost of holding money (instead of the nominal interest rate), its influence on 
domestic money demand will be negative (note the similarity between the 
first term in equation 53 and equation 25);  
- On the other hand, the same mechanism identified in Section 4.1 is in 
operation: a higher inflation rate, by inducing agents to hold less foreign 
money, causes the transactions demand for domestic money to increase 
(second term in 53).  
On balance, the impact of the inflation rate in the demand for domestic money 
is more likely to be negative. Strictly speaking, however, the sign of the partial 
derivative is not certain. The presence of terms with opposite signs in equations (53a) 
and in the denominatorΨ implies that the signs of (53a) and of (54) as well as of the 
remaining partial derivatives are, in general, undetermined. The key parameter in this 
ambiguity is the co-variance between prices and the exchange rate, that underlies the 
substitutability between foreign money and the real asset in the store of value 
function18.    
5.2 Purchasing power party holding instantaneously ( 22 γσρ == ) 
In this sub-section, we return to the case in which the stochastic processes of the 
exchange rate and of prices have equal variances and are perfectly correlated. As 
stated above, this case can be thought as describing an environment with very high 
inflation.  
  As argued in Section 4.2, in this case foreign money is dominated by the real 
asset, so its demand is driven by a trade  off between transaction services and 
opportunity costs (equation 39). The novelty in  respect to the model in 4.2 is that the 
agent can no longer use domestic bonds to hedge its exposure to monetary assets 
                                                
18 Interesting enough, ruling out currency substitutability is not sufficient to obtain negative 
signs in (53a) and in (54). A sufficient condition to obtain negative signs when 012 =v  is σγ > , that 
is, when the exchange rate is more volatile than prices, as it is likely to be the case under float. This 
conclusion relies on the fact that 1<= σγρR . 
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denominated in domestic currency. Hence, in this version of the model, the demand 
for domestic money is driven by risk-return considerations, in contrast to foreign 
money, which is purely held for transaction purposes. 
To investigate the properties of the money demand in this context, we substitute  
(38) in (17c), obtaining  
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This expression determines the optimal demand for domestic money as a trade 
off between risk and return. Totally differentiating (55) and (39) and solving together, 
the following partial derivatives are obtained:  
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 The interesting novelty in this case is that the demand for foreign money 
becomes influenced by portfolio decisions through the currency substitution channel, 
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just like the case of domestic money in Section 4. In case the two moneys do not 
compete in the means of payment role, then  the demand for foreign money will be 
driven by transaction services and the real interest rate, only.   
Because in this version of the model, the inflation rate plays no role in the cost 
of holding foreign money, an increase in the  inflation rate primarily impacts 
negatively on the demand for domestic money as opportunity cost, and then 
positively on the demand for foreign money through the currency substitution 
channel. In this version of the model, an increase in  the inflation rate unambiguously 
causes the demand for domestic money to decline.  
5.3. Foreign money delivering a certain nominal return ( 0== ργ ) 
We now return to the setup in which there is no exchange rate risk. In this case, 
one may interpret f as standing for a time deposit denominated in domestic currency 
paying a certain nominal return (ε). In contrast to Section 4.3, however, in this case 
there is no domestic bond dominating both types of money in the store of value role. 
Thus, the demand for both monies will depend on the respective productivities in the 
provision of transaction services and on risk-taking considerations.  
To solve this model, we turn again to (14b) and (17c). The optimal demand for 
risky assets is obtained substituting (46) in (17c), which gives:  
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Equation (21d) determines the demand for broad money, m+f.  
Substituting (46) in (14b) and solving together with (21d), these two conditions 
deliver again condition (47), which states that the returns of the two moneys at the 
margin should be equal. Totally differentiating (47) and (21d), and solving together, 
one obtains:  
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Thus, both money demands depend on wealth as well as on risk considerations, 
reflecting their portfolio roles. In this case, expected inflation influences negatively 
the demand for both monies.  
6. Summary of the results above  
The exercises above illustrate the fact that the properties of the optimal demand 
for money depend critically on the institutional setup regarding asset availability. 
They also reveal that the signs of some elasticities may change when one moves from 
a narrow monetary aggregate to a broader aggregate that includes domestic and 
foreign monetary assets. In this section, we summarise these results.  
As suggested in Section 3, when most agents in an economy have unrestricted 
access to domestic and foreign bonds, a money demand specification based on 
equations (22) looks appropriate:   
( )jicLm m .,= , with 0<miL , 0≥mjL                 (72) 
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In  (72), the partial derivative  in respect to the foreign interest rate becomes 
zero in case of no currency substitutability19. In this setup, a broad monetary 
aggregate including domestic and foreign monetary assets (x=m+f) will have the 
following properties:  
( )jicLx x .,= , with 0<xiL , 0<xjL                       (73) 
In Section 4, we addressed the case in which agents cannot use foreign bonds to 
hedge the risk exposure implied by foreign money balances. In that case, foreign 
money gets a portfolio role, unless prices and the exchange rate are perfectly 
correlated.  
In the more general case in which the correlation is positive but not one 
(Section 4.1), the properties of the demand for domestic money are as follows 
(equations 25-30):  
( )wricLm m ,,,,,,, σγπε= , with 0<miL , 0≤mLε , 0≥= mrm LLπ , 0≥mLγ , 0≤mwL . (74) 
In case of no currency substitutability, all inequalities turn zero and the demand 
for domestic money simplifies to the closed economy form. From (31)-(36) and (25)-
(30), an extended monetary aggregate comprehending money holdings denominated 
in domestic currency and in foreign currency (x=m+f), will have the following 
properties: 
( )wricLx x ,,,,,,, σγπε= , with 0<xiL , 0>mLε , 0<= xrx LLπ , 0<xLγ , 0>xwL . (75) 
Thus, when one moves from a money aggregate including assets denominated 
in domestic currency only to a broad monetary aggregate including real balances 
denominated in foreign currency, the signs of expected inflation and of real wealth 
change. In the second case, they are consistent with those postulated by the portfolio-
balance approach.   
                                                
19 With no surprise, this model has been used to test for the presence of currency substitution 
among currencies of countries and regions with developed financial markets (Joines, 1985, Bergstrand 
and Bundt, 1990, Mizen and Pentecost, 1994, and Lebre de Freitas, 2006).   
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A second interesting case occurs when prices and the exchange rate are 
perfectly correlated, as it tends to happen during hyperinflation episodes (Section 
4.2). In that case, foreign money offers a perfect hedge against the inflation risk, but 
is dominated by the real asset in the store of value role. The implication is that, there 
will be no portfolio demand for moneys. Because the relevant opportunity cost of 
holding foreign money is the real interest rate, in case of currency substitutability, the 
demand for domestic money will become a positive function of the real interest rate 
(equations 40-42):  
 ( )ricLm m ,,= , with 0<miL , 0≥mrL .                       (76) 
A question that arises is how this specification relates to the most popular one 
for hyperinflation episodes, proposed by Cagan (1956). In that specification, the 
nominal interest rate is replaced by an expected inflation term, using the Fisher 
principle. In our framework, if one used πddrdi +=  in the system (40)- (41), one 
would obtain a negative influence of expected inflation in the demand for domestic 
money ( 022 <Δ−= cvddm π ), but the sign of the real interest rate would turn 
negative ( ( ) 01222 <Δ−−= vvcdrdm ). Of course, since during hyperinflations 
changes in the real rate of return tends to be negligible, specifying the inflation rate as 
the sole determinant of money velocity is not likely to involve a significant 
specification error. Note however that the omission of the real interest rate may 
render a coefficient on the expected inflation negative and significant, even when the 
nominal interest rate is included: using πddrdi +=  to eliminate the real interest rate 
in the system (40)-(41), one obtains ( ) 01222 <Δ−−= vvcdidm  and 
012 <Δ−= cvddm π . Thus, at least theoretically, omitting the real interest rate from 
the money demand specification could deliver a spurious relationship between 
expected inflation and the money demand, even after controlling for the domestic 
interest rate. In any case, this will only happen if foreign money competes with 
domestic money in the means of payment role. Did currency substitutability not exist 
and the demand for domestic money would simplify to the closed economy form, 
regardless the restrictions on foreign bond holdings.  
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A third case explored in this paper is when there is no exchange rate risk 
(Section 4.3), as it would be the case of a credibly fixed exchange rate regime. In this 
case, the two monies can also be interpreted as monetary assets denominated in 
domestic currency with different productivity in the production of liquidity services 
(like narrow money and quasi money).   Since in this case both monies are dominated 
by a domestic bond, no money demand shall be influenced by the inflation rate. The 
demand for narrow money takes the form (48-51):    
( )ε,, icLm m= , with 0<miL , 0≤mLε ,                        (77) 
where ε denotes for the interest rate in the time deposit. The demand for broad money 
(m2=m+f), obeys to: 
 ( )ε,,2 2 icLm m= , with 02 <miL , 02 >mLε .                        (78) 
We then analysed the case in which domestic bonds are not available. In this 
case, the optimal demand for domestic money obeys to a trade-off between risk and 
return. Because the relevant alternative to money holdings is the real asset, both 
money demands will be impacted negatively by increases in expected inflation. 
However, the role of inflation as opportunity cost of holding domestic money is 
mitigated by the mechanism referred above through which inflation can cause the 
demand for domestic money to increase. Formally, it is possible that the money 
demand depends positively on expected inflation (equations 53-53a). The key 
parameter influencing the  sign of the partial derivative of domestic money in respect 
to the inflation rate is the co-variance between inflation and the exchange rate.   
To further investigate the case when both moneys are dominated, we then 
considered two extreme cases regarding the size of the co-variance between prices 
and the exchange rate.   
The first case is when purchasing power parity holds instantaneously, so that 
foreign money becomes dominated by the real asset in the store of value role. In this 
case, the demand for domestic money gets the following properties (equations 56-59):  
( )wrcLm m ,,,, σπ= , with 0<mLπ  , 0<mrL 0>mwL .           (79) 
In this setup, moving from a money aggregate that includes assets denominated 
in domestic currency only (m) to a money aggregate that includes assets denominated 
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in both currencies (x=m+f) does not change qualitatively the properties of the money 
demand (equations 56-63).  
As a final exercise, we considered the case in which there is no exchange rate 
risk and the agent is constrained on her holdings of domestic and foreign bonds. In 
this case, the two monies deliver the same risk, though they differ in terms of 
provision of liquidity services. The properties of the demand for domestic/narrow 
money are as follows (equations 64-67):  
( )wcLm m ,,,, σπε= , with 0<mLπ , 0<mLε , 0>mwL .     (80) 
A broad money aggregate comprehending both types of money (m2=m+f) will 
have the following properties:  
( )wcLm m ,,,,2 2 σπε= , with 02 <mLπ , 02 >mLε , 02 >mwL .     (81) 
Where in this case, ε denotes for the interest rate in the time deposit.  
7.  Conclusions  
In this paper, we  investigated the circumstances under which the demand for 
domestic money shall depend on the inflation rate, using an optimizing model where 
money holdings help reduce transaction costs. In particular, we explored the case in 
which the range of assets available to the representative agent includes a real asset 
offering a perfect hedge against the inflation risk.  
As demonstrated in the earlier literature, under complete bond markets, the 
money demand shall not be influenced by portfolio considerations. If however agents 
face a binding constraint in their bond holdings, the demand for like-denominated 
money will become driven by portfolio considerations. Exploring this direction, we 
first analysed the case in which agents are constrained in their holdings of foreign 
bonds, but not on their holdings of domestic bonds. In this case, the eventual 
influence of expected inflation on the demand for domestic money is, at most, 
positive, never negative.  
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We then introduced a binding constraint in the holdings of domestic bonds. In 
this case, the influence of expected inflation on the money demand obeys to a balance 
between two effects: on one hand, an increase in expected inflation may cause the 
individual to decrease its holdings of foreign money, which may imply an increase in 
the demand for domestic money through the currency substitution channel. On the 
other hand, the increase in expected inflation rises the cost of holding domestic 
money, inducing a lower demand. On balance, the second effect is more likely to 
dominate, though formally this is not a general case.  
We also explored a version of the model where there is no exchange rate risk, 
so that foreign money becomes equivalent to a second category of domestic money, 
like time deposits, which pay a positive nominal return but are less productive in 
terms of liquidity services. We showed that such modification does not change the 
main proposition that, as long as money is dominated by an interest-bearing asset, its 
demand should not depend negatively on the inflation rate. In  order for the money 
demand to depend negatively on the inflation rate, one has to suppress domestic 
bonds from the range of alternative assets.  
All in all, in no case we found an institutional setup where both the inflation 
rate and the nominal interest rate influence negatively the money demand, as usually 
postulated by the portfolio balance approach.  
The main message of the paper is that the money demand properties are context 
specific. The optimal demand for money may be driven by portfolio considerations or 
not, depending on the range of assets that are at disposal of the optimising agent. 
Because economies are composed by heterogeneous agents, no particular setup shall 
be seen as applying for an economy as a whole. Thus, rather than relying on ad hoc 
specifications for the money demand (as suggested by the portfolio-balance 
approach), the researcher may try instead to take opportunity of modern econometric 
techniques, to disentangle in each particular context the sign and significance of the 
different variables in the long run money demand relationship, and then infer about 
the dominant constraints regarding asset availability.  
  
 33 
References 
Barnett, W., 1978. The user cost of money. Economic Letters, 145-149.  
Barro, R. And Fisher, S., 1976. Recent developments in monetary theory. Journal of 
Monetary Economics 2, 133-67.   
Branson, William and Henderson, Dale (1985) ‘The specification and influence of 
asset markets,’ in: Handbook of International Economics, Vol. II, ed. R. W. 
Jones and P. B. Kenen (Amsterdam: North Holland) 
Cagan, Phillip, 1956. "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation". In Friedman, 
Milton (ed.). Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Calvo, G., Végh, C., 1990. Interest rate policy in a small open economy. IMF Staff 
Papers 37 (4), 753-776.  
Clower, R. 1967. "A Reconsideration of the Microfoundations of Monetary Theory," 
Western Economic Journal, 6(1), pp. 1-8.   
Coenen, G. and Vega, J. L. (2001) “The Demand for M3 in the Euro Area” Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 16 (6), November-December: 727-748.  
Cuddington, J. , 1989. Review of ‘Currency Substitution: Theory and Evidence from 
Latin America?, V.A. Canto, Nickelburg, G. Journal of Money Credit and 
Banking 21, 267-271.    
Dregger, C., Wolters, J., 2010. M3 money demand and excess liquidity in the euro 
area, Journal of International Money and Finance 29, 111-122.  
Ericsson, N., 1998. Empirical modelling of money demand, Empirical Economics, 
Springer, 23(3), 295-315.  
Fase, M. and Winder, C. (1998) “Wealth and the demand for money in the European 
Union” Empirical Economics 23 (3): 507-524.  
Feenstra, R., 1986. Liquidity costs and the utility of money, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 17, 271-291.  
Friedman, M., 1956. The quantity theory of money: a restatement, in Studies in the 
Quantity Theory of Money, University Chicago Press.  
Goldfajn, I., 1998. Public debt indexation and denomination: the case of Brazil, IMF 
Working Paper 18/98, February.  
 34 
Joines, D., International currency substitution and the income velocity of money. 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 4, 303-316.  
Kareken, John and Neil Wallace (1981) ‘On the indeterminacy of equilibrium 
exchange rates,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 96, 207-22 
Kiyotaki, N., Wright, R., 1989. On Money as a Medium of Exchange, Journal of 
Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, 
August.  
Lebre de Freitas, M. (2004) ‘The dynamics of Inflation and Currency Substitution in 
a Small Open Economy,’ Journal of International Money and Finance 23 (1), 
133-142.  
Lebre de Freitas, M. (2006) ‘Currency Substitution and Money Demand in Euroland,’ 
Atlantic Economic Journal, 34 (3), 275-287.  
Lebre de Freitas, M. and Veiga, F. (2006) ‘Currency Substitution, Portfolio 
Diversification and Money Demand’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 39(3), 
719-43.  
McCallum, B., Goodfriend, M., 1988. Theoretical analysis of the demand for money. 
Economic Review,  16-24.  
Merton, R., 1969. Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: the continuous time 
case. Review of Economics and Statistics 51, 247-257.    
Sahay, R., Végh, C., 1996. ‘Dollarisation in Transition Economies, Evidence and 
Policy Implications,’ in The Macroeconomics of International Currencies: 
Theory, Policy and Evidence, ed. P. Mizen and E. Pentecost (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar), 193-224 
Saving, T. R., 1971. Transaction Costs and the Demand for Money. American 
Economic Review 61, 407-20.  
Sidrauski, M., 1967. Rational Choice and Patterns of growth  in a monetary economy. 
American Economic Review 57, 534-44.    
Thomas, Lee (1985) ‘Portfolio Theory and Currency Substitution,’ Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 17 (2), 347-357 
Tobin, J. (1958), Liquidity preference as behaviour towards risk. Review of 
EconomicStudies 25, 65-86.  
 35 
Tobin, J. (1969), ‘A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory’, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 1, 15-29.    
Vegh, C., 1989. The optimal inflation tax in the presence of currency substitution, 
Journal of monetary economics 24, 139-146.  
 
Most Recent Working Paper 
 
 
NIPE WP 
13/2014 
Lebre de Freitas, Miguel “ On inflation and money demand in a portfolio model with shopping 
costs ”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
12/2014 
Lebre de Freitas, Miguel e Miguel de Faria e Castro “The Portuguese real exchange rate, 1995-
2010: competitiveness or price effects”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
11/2014 
Morozumi, Atsuyoshi e Veiga, Francisco José, “Public spending and growth: the role of 
institutions”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
10/2014 
Brekke, Kurt R.,  Siciliani, Luigi e Straume, Odd Rune, “Hospital Mergers with Regulated 
Prices”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
09/2014 
Esteves, Rosa-Branca, “Behavior-Based Price Discrimination with Retention Offers”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
08/2014 
Esteves, Rosa-Branca e Sofia Cerqueira, “Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination under 
Advertising and Imperfectly Informed Consumers”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
07/2014 
Brekke, K.R., Siciliani, L. e Odd Rune Straume, “Horizontal Mergers and Product Quality”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
06/2014 
Hammoudeh, S., Nguyen, Duc K. e Ricardo M. Sousa, "Energy prices and CO2 emission 
allowance prices: A quantile regression approach",2014 
NIPE WP 
05/2014 
Hammoudeh, S., Lahiani, A., Nguyen, Duc, K. e Ricardo M. Sousa, "Asymmetric and nonlinear 
pass-through of energy prices to CO2 emission allowance prices", 2014 
NIPE WP 
04/2014 
Hammoudeh, S., Nguyen, Duc K. e Ricardo M. Sousa, "What explains the short-term dynamics 
of the prices of CO2 emissions?", 2014 
NIPE WP 
03/2014 
Sousa, Rita, Aguiar- Conraria e Maria Joana Soares, “Carbon Financial Markets: a time-
frequency analysis of CO2 price drivers”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
02/2014 
Sousa, Rita e Luís Aguiar-Conraria, “Dynamics of CO2 price drivers”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
01/2014 
Brekke, Kurt R., Holmäs, Tor Helge e Straume, Odd Rune, "Price Regulation and Parallel 
Imports of Pharmaceuticals”, 2014 
NIPE WP 
22/2013 
Leal, Cristiana Cerqueira, Armada, Manuel Rocha e Loureiro, Gilberto , "Individual 
Investors Repurchasing Behavior: Preference for Stocks Previously Owned”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
21/2013 
Loureiro, Gilberto e Alvaro G. Taboada, “Equity Offerings Abroad and the adoption of IFRS: A 
test of the Capital Markets Liability of Foreignness”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
20/2013 
Loureiro, Gilberto e Alvaro G. Taboada, “Do Improvements in the Information Environment 
Affect Real Investment Decisions?”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
19/2013 
Bogas, Patrícia e Natália Barbosa, “High-Growth Firms: What is the Impact of Region-Specific 
Characteristics?”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
18/2013 
Portela, Miguel e Paul Schweinzer, “The Parental Co-Immunization Hypothesis”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
17/2013 
Martins, Susana e Francisco José Veiga, “Government size, composition of public expenditure, 
and economic development”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
16/2013 
Bastos, Paulo e Odd Rune Straume, “Preschool education in Brazil: Does public supply crowd 
out private enrollment?”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
15/2013 
Martins, Rodrigo e Francisco José Veiga, “Does voter turnout affect the votes for the incumbent 
government?”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
14/2013 
Aguiar-Conraria, Luís, Pedro C. Magalhães e Christoph A. Vanberg, “Experimental evidence 
that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
13/2013 
Silva, José Ferreira, J. Cadima Ribeiro, “As Assimetrias Regionais em Portugal: análise da 
convergência versus divergência ao nível dos municípios”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
12/2013 
Faria, Ana Paula, Natália Barbosa e Vasco Eiriz, “Firms’ innovation across regions: an 
exploratory study”, 2013 
NIPE WP 
11/2013 
Veiga, Francisco José, “Instituições, Estabilidade Política e Desempenho Económico 
Implicações para Portugal”, 2013 
